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Abstract
We consider hedonic coalition formation games that are induced by a simple TU-
game and a cooperative solution. For such models, Shenoy’s (1979) absence of the
paradox of smaller coalitions provides a sufficient condition for core existence. We
present three different versions of his condition in order to compare it to the top
coalition property of Banerjee et al. (2001) that guarantees nonemptiness of the core
in more general models. As it turns out, the top coalition property implies a condition
in which Shenoy’s paradox is not present for at least one minimal winning coalition.
Conversely, if for each non-null player Shenoy’s paradox is not present for at least
one minimal winning coalition containing that player, then the induced hedonic game
satisfies the top coalition property.
JEL Classification: D72, C71
Keywords: coalition formation, core, paradox of smaller coalitions, simple games, top
coalition property
1 Introduction
One of the most apparent applications of coalition formation games is the formation of gov-
ernments after a political election. A simple (TU-) game thereby describes the possibilities
to form majorities, whereas application of a cooperative solution concept (e.g. a power index)
yields a party’s power within a government. In fact, for each party one obtains preferences
over possible coalitions (governments) it is a member of. That means, we induce a hedonic
coalition formation game (see, e.g., Shenoy (1979)).
∗D. Dimitrov gratefully acknowledges financial support from the German Research Foundation (DFG).
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Solutions for hedonic games, such as core stability, then propose a (set of) stable coalition
structures that roughly partition the set of players into a winning coalition (the government)
and a losing one; and therefore arrive at a notion of a stable government.
For this (specific) context, Shenoy (1979) on the one hand introduced a sufficient con-
dition for nonemptiness of the core termed absence of the paradox of smaller coalitions.
Essentially, it requires that a party should not suffer from a re-formation of the government
by throwing out other parties. On the other hand, Banerjee et al. (2001) discuss a condi-
tion that ensures core existence for general hedonic games; the top coalition property. Each
coalition is required to have a subcoalition that is favored most among all subcoalitions by
any of its members.
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between these two sufficient conditions.
More precisely, we first present three versions of Shenoy’s condition, each of them being
weaker than the previous one. However, as a generalization of Shenoy’s result, even the
weakest form is still sufficient to obtain core existence (Proposition 1). Second, we range in
the top coalition property by showing which of the above versions it implies and by which it
is implied (Propositions 2 and 3). In effect, we answer the following two questions: (1) To
what extent is the paradox of smaller coalitions allowed to appear, when the induced hedonic
game satisfies the top coalition property and (2) How much of the absence of the paradox of
smaller coalitions needs to hold in order to have the induced hedonic game satisfy the top
coalition property.
The next section contains preliminaries on simple games and hedonic games. In Section 3
we introduce two weaker versions of Shenoy’s (1979) original condition and show that the
weakest of them suffices for nonemptiness of the core of the induced hedonic game. The im-
plications between the top coalition property and these two weaker conditions are presented
in Section 4. We close by showing in two examples that the implications are not reversible.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Simple games and solutions
Let N be a finite set of players, which we will keep fixed throughout the paper. A (co-
operative) simple game with transferable utility (a simple game) is a pair (N, v), where
v : 2N → {0, 1} is called characteristic function and satisfies v(∅) = 0. We refer to a coali-
tion S ⊆ N with v(S) = 1 as a winning coalition. In what follows we will identify a simple
game (N, v) with its characteristic function v.
A simple game v is monotonic if v(S) = 1 implies v(T ) = 1 for all T ⊇ S, and proper
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if v(S) = 1 implies v(N \ S) = 0. We denote by Wv = {S ⊆ N | v(S) = 1} the set of
winning coalitions and by MWv = {S ⊆ N | v(S) = 1 and v(T ) = 0 for all T ⊂ S} the set
of minimal winning coalitions in the simple game v (cf. Shapley (1962)). For S ⊆ N define
the subgame (N, vS) by vS (T ) = v (S ∩ T ) for all T ∈ 2
N . Note that vS is also a simple
game with player set N (possibly with vS(N) = v(S) = 0). The set of all proper monotonic
simple games on the player set N will be denoted by G. Clearly, if a game v is in the set G,
then so is any of its subgames.
A player i ∈ N is a null player in v ∈ G if v (S) = v (S \ {i}) for all S ⊆ N . For any
W ∈ Wv, we denote by Av(W ) the set of all players from W who are not null players in vW .
For any W ∈ Wv and any i ∈ Av(W ), we denote by Mvi (W ) the set of all minimal winning
coalitions in W containing i.
A (feasible) solution (of a proper monotonic simple game) is a mapping ϕ : G → RN+
satisfying
∑
i∈N ϕi(v) ≤ v(N) for all v ∈ G. Thus, it takes each v ∈ G to a single vector in
RN+ . That means, it assigns a nonnegative real number ϕi (v) to each player i ∈ N , which
we interpret as player i’s power in the game v.1 The set of all feasible solutions on G will be
denoted by S.
In what follows, we make use of the solution ϕ in the following way. Suppose a simple
game v describes the possibilities for players to form winning coalitions and suppose that
such a winning coalition S has formed. When the members of S have to agree on how power
is shared among them, then the subgame vS naturally should be taken into account, as it
reflects possibilities given S has already formed. For example, within a minimal winning
coalition, all members should be treated equally, since all have the same possibilities to form
other winning coalitions within S (see Dimitrov & Haake (2006) for further details).
It turns out that the following property of a solution is the main source to drive the
results in the remainder of the paper. It says that within minimal winning coalitions, the
total power of 1 is shared equally. Formally, a solution ϕ ∈ S satisfies equal treatment in
minimal winning coalitions, if for all v ∈ G, S ∈MW v and i ∈ S we have
(ETMW) ϕi(vS) =
1
|S|
.
Remark 1 The (more familiar) conditions of coalitional efficiency and symmetry together
are sufficient for the ETMW requirement to hold. Formally, a solution ϕ ∈ S satisfies
coalitional efficiency if
∑
i∈S ϕi(vS) = vS(S) holds for all v ∈ G and all S ∈ 2
N . Players
i, j ∈ N are symmetric in v ∈ G, if v (S ∪ {i}) = v (S ∪ {j}) for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j}. A
solution ϕ ∈ S is symmetric if ϕi (v) = ϕj (v) for all v ∈ G and all i, j ∈ N who are
symmetric in v.
1Requiring nonnegativity is in accordance with this interpretation of ϕ.
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Finally, a solution ϕ ∈ S satisfies the null player property if ϕi (v) = 0 holds for all v ∈ G
and i ∈ N who are null players in v.
2.2 Hedonic games, core stability and the top coalition property
For each player i ∈ N we denote by Ni = {X ⊆ N | i ∈ X} the collection of all coalitions
containing i. A partition Π of N is called a coalition structure. For each coalition structure
Π and each player i ∈ N , we denote by Π(i) the coalition in Π containing player i, i.e.,
Π(i) ∈ Π and i ∈ Π(i).
Further, we assume that each player i ∈ N is endowed with a preference ºi over Ni, i.e.,
a binary relation over Ni which is reflexive, complete, and transitive. Denote by Âi the asso-
ciated strict relation and by º:= (º1,º2, . . . ,ºn) the corresponding profile of preferences.
A player’s preference relation over coalitions canonically induces a preference relation over
coalition structures in the following way:2 For any two coalition structures Π and Π′, player
i weakly prefers Π to Π′ if and only if he weakly prefers “his” coalition in Π to the one in
Π′, i.e., Π ºi Π
′ if and only if Π(i) ºi Π
′(i). Hence, we assume that players’ preferences
over coalition structures are purely hedonic, i.e., they are completely characterized by their
preferences over coalitions. Finally, a hedonic game (N,º) is a pair consisting of the set
of players and a preference profile (cf. Banerjee et al. (2001) and Bogomolnaia & Jackson
(2002)).
Unlike solution concepts for (simple) cooperative games do, there is no worth to distribute
in hedonic games. The relevant question is rather, which coalition structure should form,
taking players’ preferences into account. The basic property is the one of core stability.
Let (N,º) be a hedonic game. A partition Π of N is core stable if there does not exist
a nonempty coalition X such that X Âi Π(i) holds for each i ∈ X. Put in other words, a
coalition structure Π is core stable if no group of players are willing to form a coalition, so
that each player is better off with this new coalition compared to the corresponding coalitions
in Π. In what follows, we denote by C (N,º) the set of core stable coalition structures of a
hedonic game (N,º). Alternatively, we call C (N,º) the core of (N,º).
The top coalition property, introduced by Banerjee et al. (2001), is a sufficient condition
for nonemptiness of the core and it is satisfied in many interesting economic applications.
Given a hedonic game (N,º) and a player set V ⊆ N , a coalition S ⊆ V is a top coalition
of V if for any i ∈ S and any T ⊆ V with i ∈ T , one has S ºi T . The game (N,º) satisfies
the top coalition property if every player set has a top coalition.
2With slight abuse in notation, we use the same symbol to denote preferences over coalitions and prefer-
ences over coalition structures.
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2.3 Hedonic games via solutions of simple games
Now, each pair (v, ϕ) ∈ G × S of a simple game and a solution naturally induces a hedonic
game in the following way: For each player i ∈ N define a preference relation ºi over Ni by
(1) S ºi T if and only if ϕi (vS) ≥ ϕi (vT ) (S, T ∈ Ni).
Put differently, ϕi(v•)|Ni is a representation of i’s preferences. Still put in another way, player
i evaluates a coalition S that he is a member of by how much power he obtains within S
according to the solution ϕ. Notice that paying attention to the corresponding coalitions is
compatible with the very definition of a hedonic game; each player in such a game evaluates
any two coalition structures based only on his preferences over the coalitions in the two
partitions he belongs to (cf. Aumann and Dre´ze (1974) and Shenoy (1979)).
It is apparent that for any hedonic game (N,º) that is induced by (v, ϕ) as in (1), a coali-
tion structure Π can only be stable if it contains a winning coalition. Hence, by properness
of v, there is exactly one winning coalition in each core stable coalition structure. Therefore,
choosing a core stable coalition structure may be interpreted as choosing a “stable” winning
coalition (i.e., a government) in the underlying simple game.
3 The paradox of smaller coalitions and core stability
Let v ∈ G and ϕ ∈ S. The main building blocks in our analysis will be pairs (W,S) of
winning coalitions satisfying S ⊆ W . Then, the pair (v, ϕ) ∈ G×S of a game and a solution
does not exhibit the paradox of smaller coalitions on (W,S), if ϕi (vS) ≥ ϕi (vW ) holds for all
i ∈ S. In words, if a smaller winning coalition S forms, then each player’s power, measured
by ϕ, should not decrease, since there are fewer players to share the same total amount of
power.
Starting with the original definition in Shenoy (1979), we define three different extents
to which a pair (v, ϕ) ∈ G × S does not exhibit the paradox of smaller coalitions. More
precisely, we specify for which pairs (W,S) the paradox should not occur.
(C1) A pair (v, ϕ) ∈ G × S satisfies C1, if for all W,S ∈ W v with S ⊆ W the pair (v, ϕ)
does not exhibit the paradox of smaller coalitions on (W,S).
(C2) A pair (v, ϕ) ∈ G × S satisfies C2, if for all W ∈ W v and all i ∈ Av(W ), there exists
S ∈ Mvi (W ) such that (v, ϕ) does not exhibit the paradox of smaller coalitions on
(W,S).
(C3) A pair (v, ϕ) ∈ G × S satisfies C3, if for all W ∈ W v, there exists S ∈ MWv with
S ⊆ W such that (v, ϕ) does not exhibit the paradox of smaller coalitions on (W,S).
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Clearly, condition C2 is weaker than C1.3 While C1 requires the absence of the paradox
for all pairs (W,S) with S ⊆ W , the requirement in C2 is only that for each W ∈ W v and
each non-null player in vW there has to be a minimal winning coalition S containing that
player such that the paradox of smaller coalitions is not there on (W,S).
Condition C3 is even weaker than C2. Here we only claim that any winning coalition W
contains some minimal winning coalition S so that no paradox shows up on (W,S). If C2 is
satisfied one may take a non-null player’s coalition S ∈Mvi (W ) as in the formulation of C2
which shows C3.
Shenoy (1979, Theorem 7.4) uses condition C1 to derive a core existence result for hedonic
games (N,º) that are induced as in (1). Thereby, he uses the Shapley value4 as solution ϕ.
The following proposition shows that the weaker condition C3 is sufficient for core existence,
in case the solution satisfies the null player property and the equal treatment in minimal
winning coalitions requirement.
Proposition 1 Let v ∈ G and ϕ ∈ S satisfy the null player property and ETMW. Let
(N,º) be induced as in (1). If (v, ϕ) satisfies C3, then C (N,º) 6= ∅.
Proof. Let T ∈MWv be with minimal cardinality and Π be a coalition structure containing
T . We show that Π is core stable.
Suppose to the contrary that there is X ⊆ N such that
(2) X Âi Π (i) for each i ∈ X.
Clearly, X ∈ Wv. By C3, there exists a minimal winning coalition Y ⊆ X such that
(3) ϕi (vY ) ≥ ϕi (vX) for each i ∈ Y.
By the properness of v, Y ∩ T 6= ∅. Hence, there is i ∈ Y ∩ T such that
1
|Y |
= ϕi (vY ) ≥ ϕi (vX) > ϕi
(
vΠ(i)
)
= ϕi (vT ) =
1
|T |
,
where the first inequality is due to (3), the second due to (2), and the two outer equalities
follow from ETMW. Notice, however, that we have a contradiction to |T | ≤ |Y |. ¤
Note finally, that the Bundestag game discussed in Dimitrov & Haake (2006) shows that
C3 is not a necessary condition for core existence.
3Examples are easily constructed, since C2 means no requirement for pairs (W,S) where both coalitions
are winning but not minimal winning.
4or Shapley-Shubik index as it is often termed in this setup; see Shapley (1953) and Shapley and Shubik
(1954).
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4 Implications
Proposition 1 establishes a sufficient condition for nonemptiness of the core for a specific class
of hedonic games. As mentioned above, the top coalition property also suffices to obtain
core elements. In this section we range in the top coalition property into the versions of
the absence of a paradox. We start by showing that condition C2 implies the top coalition
property.
Proposition 2 Let v ∈ G and ϕ ∈ S satisfy the null player property and ETMW. Let
(N,º) be induced as in (1). If (v, ϕ) satisfies C2, then (N,º) satisfies the top coalition
property.
Proof. We have to show that there exists a top coalition for each player set U ⊆ N . Take
U ⊆ N and consider the following two possible cases:
Case 1 (U /∈ Wv): By monotonicity of v and the null player property of ϕ, each subset of
U is a top coalition of U .
Case 2 (U ∈ Wv): Let S ⊆ U be a smallest (in terms of cardinality) minimal winning
coalition contained in U . We show that S is a top coalition of U , i.e., we show that S ºi T
for each i ∈ S and each T ⊆ U with i ∈ T . Take T ⊆ U and consider the following three
subcases:
Subcase 2.1 (T /∈ Wv): By non-negativity of ϕ and the null player property, we have
ϕi (vS) ≥ 0 = ϕi (vT ) for each i ∈ S ∩ T and thus, S ºi T for each i ∈ S ∩ T .
Subcase 2.2 (T ∈ Wv and T ⊇ S): Let i ∈ S. Since i is not a null player in vT , there exists
by C2 a minimal winning coalition Pi ⊆ T containing i for which
ϕk (vPi) ≥ ϕk (vT ) for all k ∈ Pi,
and in particular, by the properness of v,
ϕk (vPi) ≥ ϕk (vT ) for all k ∈ Pi ∩ S.
Since S is a smallest minimal winning coalition contained in U , i ∈ S and S ⊆ T ⊆ U , we
have |Pi| ≥ |S|. Thus, using ETMW,
ϕk (vS) =
1
|S|
≥
1
|Pi|
= ϕk (vPi) ≥ ϕk (vT ) for all k ∈ Pi ∩ S
implying that S ºk T for each k ∈ Pi ∩ S. Since each player from S is not a null player
in vT , the above argument can be repeatedly applied to conclude that S ºi T for each
i ∈ S ∩ T = S.
7
Subcase 2.3 (T ∈ Wv and T + S): Notice that T ∩ S 6= ∅ by properness of v. Let
i ∈ S ∩ T . If i is a null player in vT , then, by ETMW and the null player property,
ϕi (vS) =
1
|S|
> 0 = ϕi (vT ). If i is not a null player in vT , there exists by C2 a minimal
wining coalition R ⊆ T containing i such that ϕk (vR) ≥ ϕk (vT ) for each k ∈ R. Observe
then that ϕi (vS) =
1
|S|
≥ 1
|R|
= ϕi (vR) ≥ ϕi (vT ) where the first inequality follows from
the minimality of S and the equalities from ETMW. We conclude that S ºi T for each
i ∈ S ∩ T .
The two cases together show that S ºi T for each i ∈ S ∩ T and each T ⊆ U ; thus, S is
a top coalition of U . ¤
The next result (Proposition 3) demonstrates that the top coalition property implies
condition C3. This implication even holds, if we do not impose the null player property. In
order to prove this result, we make use of the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Let v ∈ G, ϕ ∈ S satisfy ETMW and (N,º) be induced as in (1). Let W ∈ W v
and T ⊆ W be a top coalition of W . Then, T contains only one minimal winning coalition.
Proof. Let P and Q be two different minimal winning coalitions contained in T . Then,
since T is a top coalition of W , P ⊂ T , and by ETMW, ϕi (vT ) ≥ ϕi (vP ) =
1
|P |
> 0 for each
i ∈ P . Using the feasibility constraint
∑
i∈N ϕi(vT ) ≤ vT (N) = v(T ) = 1 and non-negativity
of ϕ (·), this implies ϕi (vT ) = 0 for each i ∈ T \P . With the same argument, ϕi (vT ) = 0 for
each i ∈ T \Q. Since there is at least one player who belongs to P but not to Q, we have a
contradiction. ¤
Remark 2 In view of the proof of Lemma 1, if T ⊆ W is a top coalition of W ∈ W v, then
the minimal winning coalition contained in T is a top coalition of W as well.
Proposition 3 Let v ∈ G, ϕ ∈ S satisfy ETMW, and let (N,º) be induced as in (1). If
(N,º) satisfies the top coalition property, then (v, ϕ) satisfies condition C3.
Proof. We have to show that for each W ∈ Wv there exists S ∈ MWv with S ⊆ W such
that ϕi (vS) ≥ ϕi (vW ) for each i ∈ S. Let W ∈ W
v, T be a top coalition of W , and let
T ′ be the minimal winning coalition contained in T (see Lemma 1). By Remark 2, T ′ is a
top coalition of W as well. By the definition of a top coalition, ϕi (vT ′) ≥ ϕi (vW ) for each
i ∈ T ′. Thus, we conclude that (v, ϕ) satisfies condition C3. ¤
So, Propositions 2 and 3 show where to range in the top coalition property in the present
setup. Observe also that due to Proposition 1, we can confirm that the top coalition property
is a sufficient condition for existence of core stable coalition structures. We close by showing
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that neither of the two implications in Propositions 2 and 3 can be reversed. This is done
by the following examples.
Example 1 (Top coalition property does not imply C2)
Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and v ∈ G be given by MWv := {12, 134}5. Let the solution ϕ be
defined as follows:
ϕ(v1234) = ϕ(v123) = ϕ(v124) = ϕ(v12) = (
1
2
,
1
2
, 0, 0), ϕ(v134) = (
1
3
, 0,
1
3
,
1
3
),
and ϕ(vS) = 0 for all S 6∈ W
v. Clearly, ϕ satisfies ETMW and the null player property.
Further, it is easy to check that the top coalition property is satisfied. Note for this, that
the coalition 134 is a top coalition of itself and 12 is a top coalition of any other winning
coalition. However, C2 is violated. To see this, take player i = 4 ∈ Av(N). The only minimal
winning subcoalition of N that contains i is S = 134. But (v, ϕ) does show the paradox of
smaller coalitions on (N,S), as ϕ1(vS) =
1
3
< 1
2
= ϕ1(vN). ¤
Example 2 (C3 does not imply the top coalition property)
Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and v ∈ G be given by MWv := {12, 13, 14, 234}. Furthermore, ϕ ∈ S
is defined by
ϕ(v1234) = (
2
3
,
1
9
,
1
9
,
1
9
), ϕ(v123) = (
1
2
,
1
4
,
1
4
, 0), ϕ(v124) = (
1
2
,
1
4
, 0,
1
4
), ϕ(v134) = (
1
2
, 0,
1
4
,
1
4
),
ϕ(v12) = (
1
2
,
1
2
, 0, 0), ϕ(v13) = (
1
2
, 0,
1
2
, 0), ϕ(v14) = (
1
2
, 0, 0,
1
2
), ϕ(v234) = (0,
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
),
and ϕ(vS) = 0 for all S 6∈ W
v. Again, ϕ satisfies ETMW.
Then, on the one hand C3 is satisfied. For instance, for the winning coalition N the minimal
winning coalition 234 satisfies ϕi(v234) ≥ ϕi(vN) for all i = 2, 3, 4. On the other hand, the
top coalition property is not satisfied, as N does not possess a top coalition. To see this, N
itself is not a top coalition, since all members of 234 are better off in 234. Coalition S = 234
is not a top coalition of N , either, since any of the players 2, 3, 4 is better off in a coalition
with player 1. However, player 1 strictly favors the grand coalition. Hence, the example
shows that the top coalition property is not implied by C3. ¤
To sum the results, we have established the following implications, none of which is
reversible:
C1 (no paradox) =⇒ C2 =⇒ top coalition property =⇒ C3 =⇒ core existence.
5With slight abuse in notation for coalitions, we write, e.g., 134 instead of {1, 3, 4}.
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